Publisher's Synopsis
The chapters in this book focus on the security of the British position in the Middle East during the critical last few years between the Italian conquest of Abyssinia and the outbreak of World War II. In 1935 Britain was still able to rush reinforcements to the Middle East to forestall an extension of hostility to Egypt. However, by the time the Abyssinian crisis was over and the reinforcements stood down, the international situation had changed irrevocably.;With the German reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936, all signals indicated the possibility of a war with Germany. With the formation of the Axis Coalition, the British Chiefs of Staff insisted that they could not contemplate a simultaneous war between Germany, Japan and Italy. The triumph of Italian arms in Abyssinia and Britain's apparent inability to counter them had a devastating effect on Arab opinion. The reactions around the Arab world were ambivalent, on the one hand drawing the conclusion that the British Empire was in retreat before the dynamic fascist powers and on the other hand fearful of Italian aggression. With these concepts of foremost importance this book is divided into three main sections - the first delaing with British strategical planning in the Middle East, the second with Britain's relations with the Arab national movements in Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia and the third section which is devoted to developments in both the Arab and the Jewish communities in Palestine.
