Publisher's Synopsis
This text in microeconomics focuses on the strategic analysis of markets under imperfect competition, incomplete information, and incentives. Part I of the book covers imperfect competition, from monopoly and regulation to the strategic analysis of oligopolistic markets. Part II explains the analytics of risk, stochastic dominance, and risk aversion, supplemented with a variety of applications from different areas in economics. Part III focuses on markets and incentives under incomplete information, including a comprehensive introduction to the theory of auctions, which plays an important role in modern economics. Each chapter introduces the core issues in an accessible yet rigorous fashion, and then investigates specialized themes. Each also offers self-contained explanations and proofs. The only prerequisites are a basic knowledge of calculus and probability, and familiarity with intermediate undergraduate microeconomics. The text can be used as a textbook in different courses for senior undergraduate or first-year graduate students.
