Publisher's Synopsis
In 1991, the United States was at war - not as grand a war as the Second World War, but a significant war. This new war managed to form a coalition of many nations to fight Saddam Hussein's force and restore the ruling family of Kuwait. This book is an attempt to analyze whether the direct military involvement was a rational approach for the United States. The Bush administration crafted a plan that included a massive war coalition; it effectively outnumbered and overwhelmed the nearly one-million-strong enemy forces, and eventually increased the success of the coalition military mission. While the United States military strategies were successful in defeating the Iraqi forces in the Gulf War, this book will argue that, a decade or so from today, the way observers will perceive this event will depend in large part on whether a healthier relationship exists between the U.S. and the region at large. Clearly, much will depend on the extent to which the Gulf War diffused a crisis without producing another crisis.
