A Course in Game Theory

A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

ISBN	0262650401	Pages	368
ISBN13	9780262650403 (What's this?)	Volumes	1
Publisher	MIT Press Ltd	Weight (grammes)	499
Imprint	MIT Press	Published in	Cambridge, Mass.
Format	Paperback	Previous ISBN	9780262150415
Publication date	05 Sep 1994	Height (mm)	224
Library of Congress	HB144.O733	Width (mm)	150
DEWEY	519.3	Spine width (mm)	20
DEWEY edition	DC20	Academic level	Further/Higher education, Undergraduate, Postgraduate, Professional / Scholarly

	Preface
1	Introduction	1
I	Strategic Games	9
2	Nash Equilibrium	11
3	Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium	31
4	Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions	53
5	Knowledge and Equilibrium	67
II	Extensive Games with Perfect Information	87
6	Extensive Games with Perfect Information	89
7	Bargaining Games	117
8	Repeated Games	133
9	Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games	163
10	Implementation Theory	177
III	Extensive Games with Imperfect Information	197
11	Extensive Games with Imperfect Information	199
12	Sequential Equilibrium	219
IV	Coalitional Games	255
13	The Core	257
14	Stable Sets, the Bargaining Set, and the Shapley Value	277
15	The Nash Solution	299
	List of Results	313
	References	321
	Index	341

"I recommend this book highly, it is beautifully done..." Robert Aumann , Hebrew University

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