An Introduction to Game Theory

An exposition of modern game theory suitable for advanced undergraduates. The book emphasizes the ideas behind the theory rather than their mathematical expression, but defines all concepts precisely. It covers strategic, extensive and coalitional games and includes the topics of repeated games, bargaining theory and evolutionary equilibrium.

ISBN 0195128958   Pages 552 ISBN13 9780195128956 (What's this?)   Volumes 1 Publisher Oxford University Press   Weight (grammes) 1133 Imprint Oxford University Press Inc   Published in Oxford Format Hardback   Height (mm) 233 Publication date 02 Oct 2003   Width (mm) 190 Library of Congress 2003042981   Spine width (mm) 30 DEWEY 519.3   Academic level Tertiary education DEWEY edition DC22

		Preface
1		Introduction		1
I		Games with Perfect Information		11
2		Nash Equilibrium: Theory		13
3		Nash Equilibrium: Illustrations		55
4		Mixed Strategy Equilibrium		99
5		Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Theory		153
6		Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Illustrations		181
7		Extensive Games with Perfect Information: Extensions and Discussion		205
8		Coalitional Games and the Core		239
II		Games with Imperfect Information		271
9		Bayesian Games		273
10		Extensive Games with Imperfect Information		313
III		Variants and Extensions		359
11		Strictly Competitive Games and Maxminimization		361
12		Rationalizability		377
13		Evolutionary Equilibrium		393
14		Repeated Games: The Prisoner's Dilemma		419
15		Repeated Games: General Results		451
16		Bargaining		465
17		Appendix: Mathematics		493
		References		507
		Index		525

"This is a textbook to be enjoyed both by professors and students, full of clever and often original applications and examples. Serious students who use this text are likely to emerge with a new way of thinking about much of what they see in the real world."--Ted Bergstrom, Professor of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara "The book is just superb. I anticipate (based both on my own reading of the book, and comments from colleagues at other institutions) that this will be the standard text for introductory courses in game theory in political science departments for the foreseeable future."--Scott Gehlbach, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin "What distinguishes this book from other texts is its remarkable combination of rigor and accessibility. The central concepts of game theory are presented with the mathematical precision suitable for a graduate course, but with an abundance of wide-ranging examples that will give undergraduate students a concrete understanding of what the concepts mean and how they may be used."--Charles A. Wilson, Professor of Economics, New York University "A great book, by far the best out there in the market in thoroughness and structure."--Dorothea Herreiner, Assistant Professor of Economics, Bowdoin College "The ideal textbook for applied game theory . . . . It teaches basic game theory from the ground up, using just enough clearly defined technical terminology and ranging from traditional basics to the most modern tools."--Randy Calvert, Professor of Political Science, Washington University in St. Louis "The approach is intuitive, yet rigorous. Key concepts are explained through a series ofexamples to guide students through analysis. The examples are then followed by interesting and challenging questions. The main strength is the impressive set of exercises . . . they are extremely well organized and incredibly broad, ranging from easy questions to those for adventurous students."--In-Koo Cho, William Kinkead Distinguished Professor of Economics, University of Illinois "The gentle pace of the material along with the plethora of examples drawn from economics (mainly) and political science seems to work very well with students."-Branislav L. Slantchev, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California, San Diego "The book is excellent. It is chock full of exercises that are both interesting and applicable to real issues, allowing me great flexibility in focusing on specific examples to illustrate the theory."--Christopher Proulx, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California, Santa Barbara "This book provides a simple yet precise introduction into game theory, suitable for the undergraduate level. Author Martin J. Osborne makes use of a wide variety of examples from social and behavioral sciences to convey game-theoretic reasoning. Readers can expect to gain a thorough understanding without any previous knowledge of economics, political science, or any other social or behavioral science. No mathematics is assumed beyond that of basic high school."--Journal of Macroeconomics

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