Moral Realism

Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. In the tradition of Plato and G. E. Moore, Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. These principles are a fundamental aspect of reality, just as much as those that govern mathematics or the natural world. They may be true regardless of our ability to grasp them, and their truth is not a matter of their being ratified from any ideal standpoint, nor of being the object of actual or hypothetical consensus, nor of being an expression of our rational nature. Shafer-Landau accepts Plato's and Moore's contention that moral truths are sui generis. He rejects the currently popular efforts to conceive of ethics as a kind of science, and insists that moral truths and properties occupy a distinctive area in our ontology. Unlike scientific truths, the fundamental moral principles are knowable a priori. And unlike mathematical truths, they are essentially normative: intrinsically action-guiding, and supplying a justification for all who follow their counsel. "Moral Realism" is the first comprehensive treatise defending non-naturalistic moral realism in over a generation. It ranges over all of the central issues in contemporary metaethics, and will be an important source of discussion for philosophers and their students interested in issues concerning the foundations of ethics.

ISBN 0199280207   Pages 334 ISBN13 9780199280209 (What's this?)   Volumes 1 Publisher Oxford University Press   Weight (grammes) 511 Imprint Clarendon Press   Reprint date 21-Dec-2006 12:00:00 am Format Paperback   Published in Oxford Publication date 05 May 2005   Height (mm) 234 Library of Congress BJ1500.M67   Width (mm) 156 DEWEY 170   Spine width (mm) 19 DEWEY edition DC22   Academic level Professional / Scholarly

1		The non-cognitivist challenge		13
2		The constructivist challenge		39
3		Ethical non-naturalism		55
4		Supervenience and causation		80
5		Motivational humeanism		119
6		Motivational judgement internalism		142
7		Reasons internalism		165
8		Moral rationalism		190
9		Rationality and disagreement		215
10		Moral scepticism		231
11		The justification of moral principles		247
12		The justification of verdictive beliefs		267

A book of remarkable scope and ambition ... clear and engaging throughout ... [Shafer-Landau] develops a number of novel arguments for what is sure to be a controversial set of mutually supporting and philosophically interesting positions... very much worth reading. It is also accessible and engaging enough to be useful for teaching advanced undergraduates. Michael Ridge, Australasian Journal of Philosophy

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