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The truth of an utterance depends on various factors. Usually these factors are assumed to be: the meaning of the sentence uttered, the context in which the utterance was made, and the way things are in the world. Recently, however, a number of cases have been discussed where there seems to be reason to think that the truth of an utterance is not yet fully determined by these three factors, and that truth must therefore depend on a further factor. The most prominent examples include utterances about values, utterances attributing knowledge, utterances that state that something is probable or epistemically possible, and utterances about the contingent future. In these cases, some have argued, the standard picture needs to be modified to admit extra truth-determining factors, and there is further controversy about the exact role of any such extra factors. With contributions from some of the key figures in the contemporary debate on relativism this book is about a topic that is the focus of much traditional and current interest: whether truth is relative to standards of taste, values, or subjective informational states.It is an issue in the philosophy of language, but one with important connections to other areas of philosophy, such as meta-ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology.
| ISBN | 0199234949 | | Pages | 336 | | ISBN13 | 9780199234943
(What's this?) | | Volumes | 1 | | Publisher | Oxford University Press | | Weight (grammes) | 511 | | Imprint | Oxford University Press | | Published in | Oxford | | Format | Paperback | | Height (mm) | 234 | | Publication date | 14 Aug 2008 | | Width (mm) | 157 | | Library of Congress | 2008009946 | | Spine width (mm) | 19 | | DEWEY | 121 | | Academic level | Undergraduate, Postgraduate | | DEWEY edition | DC22 | |
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| 1 | | Introduction: "Motivations for Relativism" by Max Kobel | | 1 | | I | | Relativism Elaborated | | | | 2 | | Moderate Relativism by Francois Recanati | | 41 | | 3 | | Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals by Stefano Predelli and Isidora Stojanovic | | 63 | | 4 | | Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths by John MacFarlane | | 81 | | 5 | | Margins for Error in Context by Denis Bonnay and Paul Egre | | 103 | | 6 | | Relativism, Vagueness and What Is Said by Manuel Garcia-Carpintero | | 129 | | II | | The Metaphyiscal Significance of Relativism | | | | 7 | | Relativism about Truth Itself: Haphazard Thoughts about the Very Idea by Crispin Wright | | 157 | | 8 | | Three Forms of Truth Relativism by Iris Einheuser | | 187 | | III | | Objections to Relativism | | | | 9 | | Assertion, Belief and Disagreement by Sebastiano Moruzzi | | 207 | | 10 | | Frege, Relativism and Faultless Disagreement by Sven Rosenkranz | | 225 | | 11 | | Epistemic Modals and Correct Disagreement by Richard Dietz | | 239 | | IV | | Alternatives to Relativism | | | | 12 | | Content Relativism by Herman Cappelen | | 265 | | 13 | | Faultless or Disagreement by Andrea Iacona | | 287 | | 14 | | Presuppositions of Commonality: an Indexical Relativist Account of Disagreement by Dan Lopez de Sa | | 297 | | | | Index | | 311 |
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