This two-volume anthology contains many of the classic articles from the public choice/rational politics field and includes a new introduction prepared by the editor. Volume 1 is divided into four parts: the nature of democratic government, majority rule, other voting rules, and clubs and local politics. Volume 2 is divided into the following four parts: representative democracy, bureaucracy, political business cycles, and democratic dilemmas. Included are excerpts from such classic pieces as Buchanan and Tullock's "Calculus of Consent", Downs's "Economic Theory of Democracy", Olson's "Logic of Collective Action" and Niskanen's "Bureaucracy and Representative Government", as well as articles by Coase, May, Black, McKelvey, Groves, Ledyard, Vernon Smith, Tiebout, Breton, Stigler, Romer, Rosenthal, Arrow, Sen, Satterthwaite, Gibbard and many more.
| ISBN | 1840644257 | | DEWEY edition | DC21 | | ISBN13 | 9781840644258
(What's this?) | | Pages | 1216 | | Publisher | Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd | | Volumes | 2 Hardbacks | | Imprint | Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd | | Weight (grammes) | 1841 | | Format | Hardback | | Published in | Cheltenham | | Publication date | 27 Jun 2001 | | Series editor | Blaug, Mark, Blaug, Mark, Blaug, Mark | | Non-book description | 2 v. : | | Series title | The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics Series | | Writer of introduction | Dennis C. Mueller | | Height (mm) | 244 | | Library of Congress | HB846.8.E2 | | Width (mm) | 169 | | DEWEY | 330 | | Academic level | Postgraduate, Professional / Scholarly |
|
|
|
Volume 1: Part 1 The nature of democratic government: the principle of (approximate) unanimity and voluntary consent in taxation, Knut Wicksell; the organization of human activity, James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock; constitutional contract - the theory of law, James M. Buchanan; individual choice in voting and the market, James M. Buchanan; ethical rules, expected values and large numbers, James M. Buchanan; a theory of groups and organizations, Mancur Olson, Jr.; the problem of social cost, Ronald Coase; the problem of externality, Carl J. Dahlman. Part 2 Majority rule: a set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple majority decision, Kenneth O. May; decision-rules and individual values in constitutional choice, Douglas W. Rae; on the rationale of group decision-making, Duncan Black; Condorcet's theory of voting, H.P. Young; information aggregation, rationality and the Condorcet jury theorem, David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks; social preference orderings and majority rule, Otto A. Davis et al; when does majority rule supply public goods efficiently?, Ted C. Bergstrom; private demands for public goods, Theodore C. Bergstrom and Robert P. Goodman; on a class of equilibrium conditions for majority rule, Gerald H. Kramer; logrolling, arrow paradox and cyclical majorities, Peter Bernholz; the effects of logrolling on congressional voting, Thomas Stratmann; intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control, Richard D. McKelvey. Part 3 Other voting rules: an axiomatization of Borda's rule, H.P. Young; approval voting, Steven J. Brams and Peter C. Fishburn; a pareto optimal group decision process, E.A. Thompson; optimal allocation of public goods - a solution to the "free rider" problem, Theodore Groves and John Ledyard; the principle of unanimity and voluntary consent in social choice, Vernon L. Smith; a new and superior process for making social choices, T. Nicolaus Tideman and Gordon Tullock; voting by veto, Dennis C. Mueller; prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy, Herve Moulin. Part 4 Clubs and local politics: a pure theory of local expenditures, Charles M. Tiebout; public goods, efficiency and regional fiscal equalization, Frank Flatters et al; the effects of property taxes and local public spending on property values - an empirical study of tax capitalization and the Tiebout hypothesis, Wallace E. Oates; economic competition among jurisdictions - efficiency enhancing or distortion inducing?, Wallace E. Oates and Robert M. Schwab; an economic theory of clubs, James M. Buchanan; group segregation and optimal jurisdictions, Martin McGuire; an economic theory of alliances, Mancur Olson, Jr. and Richard Zecjhauser. Volume 2: representative democracy; bureaucracy; political business cycles; democratic dilemmas. (Part contents).
Enlarge
