Publisher's Synopsis
John Gardner was one of the most prolific, widely read, and influential scholars working in philosophy of law. This book celebrates, explores, and develops themes of his work during his sixteen years as Professor of Jurisprudence at University of Oxford. Written by a team of contributors whose own work has been influenced by Gardner's and with whom he has worked closely, this book engages with many of the concepts, themes, and issues that were central to his philosophical work and outlook. It expands on his arguments, offers original rebuttals to some, and draws connections with parallel and emerging fields that have been influenced by his work. This is the first book-length treatment covering the entire range of his scholarship, and will serve as a handbook of sorts, for those scholars seeking to engage Gardner's work and make connections across the wide range of topics on which he has written. In particular, the volume comprises discussions of duties to try and succeed in relation to Hume's maxim that 'ought implies can'; the role of continuity, conservatism, and corrective justice in private law, the interrelations between wrongdoing, blame, punishment, and the justification of criminal law, justifications, excuses, and responsibility, the distinctiveness of the wrongs of rape and discrimination, as well as general jurisprudence and how it may, or may not, illuminate the questions of normativity and the nature of constitutions. The volume also engages with further concepts and questions addressed through the prism of Gardner's work, include Indigenous rights and law, Equity, corporate responsibility and the possibility of state crimes, and the nature, structure, and phenomenology of virtue. Together, the papers collected in this volume pay homage to the breadth of John Gardner's legal philosophy. The conversations begun, or continued, in this volume will continue to inform the contributors' future work, and thus increase the likelihood that John's body of work will have an ever greater influence on the future of legal philosophy.
